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A New Racial Threat in the New South?
(A Conditional) Yes
Byron D'Andra Orey
This paper exanlines Ihrcc competing hypotheses: racial threat, social contact and racial
resentment. Using individual level and aggregate level data. these three hypotheses are tested by
examining white racial attitudes, and a variety of contextual variables, on the prospective vote for
a white racially conservative candidate. The evidence provides support for all three of these
hypotheses. Racial threat is found to be conditioned by the black population density and the resentment that whites direct toward African Americans. The probability that a white person will support
a racially conservative candidate does not depend solely on the black population. Indeed. it is
reported here that racially sympathetic whites, who live in areas with high black populationdensities
are highly unlikely to support a racially conservative candidatc. providing support for the social
contact hypothcsis. On h e other hand, whites living in the same context. but who express rescnunenl
toward African Americans, are almost certain to support dle racially conservative candidatc. Thesc
findings point to an innovative approach to examining tlie racial threat hypothesis.
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Giles and Buckner (1993) contend that race no longer plays "the central
defining role in southern politicsn (711). To be sure, the South no longer
serves as the haven for racist demagogues and the home of Jim Crow laws.
Similar to the'rest of the country, overt racism is no longer tolerated in
this region. Despite the change in the way that white racial attitudes are
expressed, however, inequalities continue to persist. Whites in the South, for
example, remain overrepresented in almost all elected positions in the political process, while blacks remain grossly underrepresented (Reeves 1998).
This phenomenon can largely be attributed to racially polarized voting
(Bositis 1998; Kleppner 1985; Loewen 1990; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989).
where whites vote for the white candidate and blacks vote for the black candidare. Because blacks constitute a minority in many jurisdictions, they are
unable to elect the candidate of their choice. Arguably, the transformation
of the region from a Democratic stronghold to a Republican stronghold at
the presidential level (Black and Black 1992). the change in party identification from Democrat to Republican by many white southern elected officials and the massive resistance to majority black districts by white southerners, point to a different type of racism that ultimately produces similar
ends as those encountered in previous eras. Indeed, Sears et al. (1997)
--
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conclude that even after the passage of civil rights legislation, "considerable
racial inequality remains in many areas of the society, such as in income,
wealth, educational attainment, health, crime, and so forth" (16).
This article expands on the author's previous work examining white
racial attitudes on the prospective vote for a white racially conservative
candidate by developing competing hypotheses. In a prior study, Knuckey
and Orey (2000) examined the 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial race featuring
an African-American liberal and a white conservative. These authors contend that the white candidate used subtle racist tactics to capture the vote
from racial conservatives. These tactics are argued to be different than those
employed by racial demagogues of the past. Even in a Deep South state like
Louisiana, whites no longer believe that African Americans are biologically
inferior to whites (e.g., "redneck racismn). The old racism of yesterday has
transformed into a new belief that African Americans simply do not live by
the work ethics espoused within the United States (see, Howell 1994). This
new form of racism has acquired many names, including "symbolic racism"
(Sears and Kinder 197l), "modem racismn (McConahay 1986). "subtle racism" (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), "racial resentmentn (Kinder and Sanders 1996) and "Laissez-faire racism" (Bobo 1997). It does not take the blatant form associated with the old racism, but it is more subtle (see Edsall
and Edsall 1991, Ch. 10).
In addition to examining white racial attitudes, a contextual analysis is
conducted in an effort to test the "black density" or "racial threat" thesis.
Recent studies in the area of race and politics have drawn conclusions noting
the failure of the racial threat hypothesis in explaining the white vote for a
racially conservative candidate or the white vote against an African-American candidate (see e.g., Voss 1996 and Carsey 1995). Here, I take the position that these analyses are incomplete and that the conclusions are premature. This research is argued to be incomplete because of data limitations.
Studies that have included aggregate level data fail to test competing theories
of racism as explanations for white vote choice. Those studies using individual level data, on the other hand, also have been hindered by data limita:
tions because these data are often secondary and do not contain questions
relating to racial attitudes (although, see Kinder and Sears 1981).
Kinder and Sears (1981) state that, "although theories of racial prejudice have been extensively catalogued, empirical confrontations between
competing theories are surprisingly rare in the social sciences" (414).
Following the lead of these authors, the research at hand investigates the
impact of racism and racial density in explaining the intended white support
for a racially conservative white candidate. The 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial race, featuring an African-American candidate, Cleo Fields, and a
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white candidate, Murphy J. "Mike" Foster, is a case in point.' Three theoretical frameworks are examined here: racial threat, derived from the political behavior literature, social contact, derived from the social psychology
literature and racial resentment, derived from the political psychology
literature.
Black Threat, Social Contact and Racial Resentment
According to Key (1949) "The hard core of the political South-and the
backbone of southern political unity-is made up of those counties and sections of the southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the population. In these areas a real problem of politics, broadly
considered, is the maintenance of control by a white minority (5). He went
on to note "Those whites who live in counties with populations 40, 50, 60,
and even 80 percent Negro share a common attitude toward the Negro (Key
1949, 5). Moreover, "[ilf the whites of the black belts give the South its
dominant political tone, the character of the politics of individual states will
vary roughly with the Negro proportion of the population (Key 1949, 5).
Based on the analysis conducted by Key (1949). white support for
racist candidates was found to be strongest in those black belt counties
where there were high concentrations of blacks. This phenomenon has since
been labeled "black threat" (e.g., Giles and Hertz 1994). Wright (1977)
confirms Key's thesis in an analysis assessing the white vote for Wallace in
the 1968 presidential election. Using individual level data and an aggregate
measurement of black density, Wright concludes that black density has an
indirect effect on the white vote for Wallace. Giles and Buckner (1993,
1995) find support for the racial threat hypothesis in their examination of the
white vote for David Duke across parishes in Louisiana in the 1990 United
States Senate race.
According to Campbell (1965), whites are threatened by the real possibility of African Americans infringing upon their social, political and economThis t y p csf threat has been categorized as a realistic
group cortflict between blacks and whites. Based on this notion, conflict is
expected to be highest when groups are competing over limited resources.
Given this scenario, the black threat hypothesis predicts that whites will
view any gains made by blacks as a zero sum game.2
Contrary to the racial threat hypothesis is the social contact hypothesis.
This hypothesis holds that as majority group members interact with members
of the minority, they become more racially t ~ l e r a n t According
.~
to Lazarsfeld et al. (1968, 137), "voting is essentially a group experience. People
who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same candidate."
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Carsey (1995) provides empirical support for the social contact hypothesis. The author reports that, the higher the black density in precincts in
New York City and Chicago and boroughs in New York City, the higher the
probability that a white person voted for the black candidate. These findings
seem to indicate that race played only a benign role in the two elections that
were examined, given a reliance solely on the black threat hypothesis. It is
argued here, however, that such a conclusion is premature due to data limitations. In other words, the data used by Carsey do not allow for an alternative explanation of racism, as suggested by Kinder and Sears (198 1). Voss
(1996) also provides some support for the social contact hypothesis by
reporting a negative estimated effect of racial density on vote choice for
parishes (the name for counties in Louisiana) in Louisiana that are at least
75 percent urban. Voss reports that those whites in Louisiana who resided
in urban areas, and areas with high black densities, were least likely to have
voted for David Duke in the 1990 U.S. Senate race, the 1991 gubernatorial
open primary, and the 1991 gubernatorial runoff. Again, as was the case
with Carsey, Voss's analysis is constrained by data limitations, in that he is
unable to test a competing hypothesis of racism (i.e., does not provide for
an alternative explanation of racism).
Symbolic racism (same as racial resentment), a concept originally
articulated by Sears and Kinder (1971), posits that white racial attitudes are
no longer shaped by "biological racism," the notion that blacks are an inherently inferior race to whites. These authors note that individuals who possess
symbolic racial attitudes believe "that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and
discipline" (Kinder and Sears 1981,416). According to Sears (1988). symbolic racism is comprised of an antiblack affect and traditional American
moral values. One of the principal architects of the symbolic racism concept,
Kinder, (see Kinder and Sanders 1996, Appendix A), has reconsidered his
decision to use symbolic racism to describe these attitudes and has opted
(along with Sanders) to use "racial resentment" as a description for such
a t t h d e s . The research Bere W w the k i d of Kinder and Sanrters and
employs racial resentment as the label for the racial attitudes described in
this paper.
The following questions are adopted by Kinder and Sanders (1996,
106-107) to operationalize racial resentment:
Blacks should work harder. (1) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other
minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do
the same without special favors. (2) Most blacks who receive money from
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welfare programs could get along without it if they tried (1986 NES).
(3) It's really a matter of some people not hying hard enough; if blacks
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
Denial of continuing racial discrimination. (4) Generations of slavery
and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks
to work their way out of the lower class (1986 and 1992 NES).
Undeserved advantage. (5) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten
less than they deserve (1986 and 1992 NES). (6) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than
from a white person (1986 NES).
Among the questions presented above, Howell (1994) uses questions 1,
2, 4 and 5 to operationalize symbolic racism. The research at hand follows
the lead of Howell.
There have been a number of criticisms regarding the face validity of
the symbolic racism concept. Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman and
Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986)
argue that the symbolic racism construct fails because it confounds the racial
attitude with the policy choice (e.g., affirmative action). Said differently,
these authors suggest that the dependent variable (affirmative-action) is not
much different than the independent variable (symbolic racism), thus making
the relationship between the two a "tautology" (Sniderman and Tetlock
1986, 135). The research here is able to avoid this concern because the
dependent variable is vote choice. Additionally, Sniderman and his colleagues criticize proponents of the symbolic racism concept for not including
such race neutral controls as individualism and egalitarianism in their examination of the impact of racial attitudes on racial policy and the vote choice
for racially conservative candidates. Both of these controls are included
here. Moreover, by including these two variables we can test whether an
antiblack effect is present. Sears (1988, 70) states that, one way to deteimine if an antiblack effect is present is to test the effects of "symbolic racism (or racial attitudes in general)" while controlling for nonracial attitudes.
Despite irs criEkisffts,bwever, sy&&
rat:*
kaf sewed as a strong
explanatory variable for a variety of individual-level political attitudes
(Howell 1994; Gilens 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears et al. 1997;
Alvarez and Brehm 1997; Huddy and Virtanen 1998). Sears and Kinder,
along with their colleagues, have attempted to address most of these criticisms. For example, Kinder and Sanders (1996, 117-120) find racial resentment to outperform such control variables as individualism and egalitarianism, in the explanation of white American's opinions on race policy. These
authors also find biological racism and racial resentment to be distinct
-
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concepts. In addition, Sears, Laar, Corrillo and Kosterman (1997) find
symbolic racism to be a strong explanation for whites' opposition to equal
opportunities for blacks, even when controlling for such nonracial values as
individualism, morality/sexuality and authoritarianism. Howell (1994)' controlling for both old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism, reports that
symbolic racism outperforms old-fashioned racism. While symbolic racism
is highly significant in each of her three models examining the vote for
David Duke, old-fashioned racism fails to achieve statistical significance.
Alvarez and Brehm (1997) find symbolic racism to be a strong explanation
for opposition to racial policies, even when controlling for rival hypotheses
such as authoritarianism and individualisn~.
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Hypotheses
This study is designed to examine the impact of racial and non-racial
attitudes on the prospective vote for a racially conservative candidate. The
hypotheses below are introduced to test whether racial threat, social contact
o r racial resentment contribute to our understanding of the white vote for a
racially conservative candidate.
Racial Resentment

IIl: It is asserted that an increase in racial resentment scores will
increase the probability of a white person voting for Foster.

The 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial Election
Social Contact Hypothesis
Two weeks prior to the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial primary, a white
candidate, Murphy J. "Mike" Foster, converted from the Democratic party
to the Republican party and made strong appeals to the whitc electorate.
This conversion increased his self-proclaimed image as a conservative.
Foster's campaign included a call to repeal affirmative action, support for
the plaintiffs in the Hays v. Louisiana case challenging the majority AfricanAmerican congressional district in which Cleo Field was the incumbent, and
opposition to the federal Motor Voter law, all of which have potentially
negative repercussions for the African-American community. Foster also
campaigned heavily for the right to carry a concealed weapon and pushed
hard on issues relating to crime. Foster refused to repudiate the endorsement
he received from former Ku Klux Klan leader and white supremacist David
Duke. In addition, Foster admitted to having paid $150,000 for Duke's
mailing list.
Although the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election campaign did not
entail the overt racism present during Key's (1949) research, there were
detections of racial coded language used by Foster. Hagen (1993) charges
tkrtt ReftttMlcm c & m
have a & p d a " ml m g m g e e f m c "
According to this line of reasoning, white candidates use "code words" to
refer rhetorically to matters pertaining to race. According to Edsa11 and
Edsall (1991, 5-6), racial code words have hidden meanings-they are implicitly race-laden. One example of Foster's use of racial coded language is
his statement that predominately white Jefferson Parish ". . . is right next.
to the jungle in New Orleans and it has a very low crime raten (cited in Ott
1995, 2).

(e

112: It is asserted that an increase in black density will decrease
ttze probability of a white person voting for Foster.
Racial Threat
The traditional racial threat hypothesis is based on the notion that an
increase in black density will increase racial conservatism among whites.
That is, in areas where African Americans are highly populated (compared
to whites), whites will attempt to maintain their social, political and economic hegemony.

H3: It is asserted that an increase in black density will increase

the probability of a white person voting for Foster.
According to Voss (1996), whites should be most threatened in majority
black cities where they have lost their political edge and in areas where poverty and crlme have the potential to ". . . exacerbate racial strife* (1 163).

H4: It is asserted that the probability of a white person indicating
a vote for Foster will increase as both black density and tile percolt urban population increases, simultaneously.
Bonacich (1976) contends that working class whites, who are in direct competition with African Americans, arc likely to be racially conscrvativc.
These whites view job competition as a zero sum game, whereby African
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Americans are given an edge throuih such programs as affirmative action
and as a result, whites lose.

H5: It is asserted that an increase in unemploymeni in high black

density areas will increase the probability of a white person voting
for Foster.
The final hypothesis examines the impact of black density and racial resentment on the prospective vote for Foster. It is argued here that black density
and racial resentment work as a tandem team to explain the white intended
vote for the racially conservative candidate. This interaction is said to
capture what Kinder and Sanders (1996) refer to as a "perceived threat."

H6: It is asserted that the probability of a white person indicating
a vore for Foster will increase as both racial resentment and black
density increase.
Data and Methods
The data base for this effort combines two separate components: a survey of white registered voters conducted in 1995, and 1990 parish level
(same as county) census data for the respondents merged with the survey
data. Thus, measurement is at the level of individual respondents, but an
aggregate level contextual measure is obtained for each respondent. The
survey data employed in this paper are drawn from the 1995 Gubernatorial
Runoff Survey conducted by the University of New Orleans Survey Research Center. It is a telephone survey in which respondents, consisting of
registered voters statewide, were selected through random digit dialing (see
Frey 1989). The Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) system
was used to record the data. The sample closely reflects the total population
distribution and the racial make-up of the state. In this analysis only white
r e s p o n examined
~ ~
because this paper is only irnmxtd in w h k
racial attitudes.
--

--

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the intended white vote for Foster. It takes
o n a value of one, meaning an intended vote for Foster and zero otherwise.
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression
for a binary variable is employed.

Independent Variables
Recent research, mainly taken from the social psychology literature (see
for example, Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986), reveals that whites still possess
negative attitudes toward African Americans, however, they are careful as
to how they display these feelings. In the current research, questions tapping
racial resentment were carefully chosen so that the antiblack nature of the
question is not made obvious to the respondent. The Likert-type items employed to measure racial resentment are drawn from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research's (ICPSR) National Election
Study (NES) surveys and the 1985 NES Pilot Study and are combined to
create an additive index scale (see Appendix C). This is an ordinal level
variable ranging from zero to one, with zero representing racially sympathetic whites and one representing whites who express resentment toward
African Americans. Based on the descriptive statistics, whites score extremely high on the racial resentment scale. Out of a possible score of 1.00, the
average score obtained by whites is .71. It is expected that racial resentment
will have a positive coefficient, suggesting that those individuals possessing
resentment towards African Americans will vote for Foster, ceteris paribus.
Black density is employed as a contextual variable and is operationalized as the percentage of the black population in the respondent's parish (the
name for counties in Louisiana). The total black population is employed
rather than the percent black registered voters, because the threat that blacks
pose to whites is based on the perception of blacks as a whole, and not
black-registered voters. If black threat is valid, we expect to find a positive
relationship with intended vote for the racially conservative Republican candidate, Mike Foster, everything else being equal. On the other hand, a negative relationship would lend support for the social contact hypothesis. In
addition to black density, two additional parish-level contextuai variables are
included: unemployment levels (Giles and Buckner 1993; 1995; 1996) and
the percentage of the population that is urban (Abrahamson 1980).
-ommei&
EM
an ittreraetkm be inekkd EOcapture the
threat that would exist between inner city blacks and whites. Thus, an interaction between the urban variable and black density variable also is included
as an independent variable.
Partisanship is measured by self-identification on a three-point scale
where Republican identification is high. Similarly, ideology is measured so
that conservative identification is high. Individualism is measured based on
a single Likert-type item consisting of a three point scale running from "The
government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and
a good standard of living" at one end (zero), to "The government shol~ld

-
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just let each person get ahead on their own" at the opposite end (one) (see
e.g. ,Gilens (1995, 1003)). According to Tuch and Hughes (1996). egalitarian beliefs reject the notion of social inequality, while placing emphasis,
instead, on "equality of racial outcomes and promqting action to reduce persisting inequalitiesn (727). This variable was measured based on the following Likert-type item: "Government should help minorities or they should
help themselves?" It is operationalized as a three-category variable that takes
o n a value of zero if the respondent indicated that minorities should help
themselves, a value of .5 represents a response of "in-between" and a value
of one if the respondent indicated that government should help minorities.
In addition to the above independent variables, the model also controls
for other variables found to be related to vote choice. These variables include gender (Howell and Pelinka 1994), age (Morin and Balz 1989; Tuch
1988). income (Giles and Evans 1985; Kinder and Sanders 1996). level of
educational attainment (Bobo and Licari 1988). Gender takes on a value of
one for males and zero for females. Income and education are ordinal variables ranging from zero to one, where zero takes on the lowest level and
one takes on the highest level. Age is measured as an ordinal level variable
in the survey. ranging from zero to one (see Cohen and Dawson 1993).
Given the expected correlation between some of the aforementioned
variables, auxiliary regressions were performed for the purpose of detecting
multicollinearity. The results indicate that there is a high level of multicollinearity amongst the interaction terms and their component variables.
High levels of multicollinearity result in large standard errors and low
significance levels. The remedy employed in this paper "centered" the component variables about their means prior to constructing the interaction terms
(Cronbach 1987; Jaccard, Turrishi, and Wan 1990). This approach will
result in reduced standard errors, however, it will not affect the magnitude
of the coefficients of the interactions, nor the calculated slopes for the
component variables.

Black Density, Racial Resentment and Vote Choice
The probability of voting for Foster increases as racial resentment increases among whites, the respective scores for those with low, moderate,
and high racial resentment being .32, .65, and .88. Someone who is racially
sympathetic, meaning that they possess a racial resentment score of zero, is
much less likely to vote for Foster than someone with a high racial resentment score of one. In fact, the difference between these two categories is 56
points.
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The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 1. As expected, racial resentment is highly significant and in the posited direction.
Both the black density variable and the interactions between percent urban
and black density, fail to achieve statistical significance, however, the coefficient of the interaction term between racial resentment and black density
does achieve statistical significance. The interaction takes on a positive sign,
indicating that those individuals who live in parishes with high concentrations of African Americans, and who possess high levels of resentment towards African Americans are likely to vote for Foster. This finding supports
the notion that a tandem relationship exists between racial density and racial
resentment in these two variables on the white prospective vote. These
results run counter to the work of Kinder and Mendelberg (1995). According to these authors, ". . . under conditions of racial proximity, the role
played by racial prejudice in white public opinion is considerably reduced"
(Kinder and Mendelberg 1995, 419). In addition, the interaction between
black density and unemployment achieves statistical significance, but it is in
the wrong direction. These findings indicate that whites who live in areas
with high concentrations of blacks and where the unemployment level is
high, are less likely to support Foster. Based on Hypothesis 5, such findings
are counterintuitive. This is an important point that is discussed more fully
below.
Nagler (1991) recommends two methods for examining interactive
effects. The author states that we can either include an interactive (multiplicative) term (applied in Table 1) or employ a disaggregation method. The
second method is recommended by Nagler, and it can assist us in better
understanding the impact of the conditional effects of racial resentment and
black density, and, black density and unemployment, on the white prospective vote. In this case, the black density variable is disaggregated to include
two categories, whereby the racial resentment and unemployment coefficients are examined. The two categories were determined a priori, based
upon Key's notion that massive resistance toward blacks occurred in those
counties (in this case parishes) with black populations over 40 percent. The
first ModeEn TabIe 2represents parishes with black populations less than
40 percent. According to Table 2, Model 1, the racial resentment coefficient
for this threshold is 1.94 and highly significant at the .O1 level. The second
threshold, Model 2, represents those parishes with a black population greater
than 40 percent. The racial resentment coefficient here, increases to 8.33
and also is highly significant at the .O1 level, despite an N of only 77. The
unemployment coefficients are even more illuminating. Table 2, Model 1,
reveals that the unemployment coefficient takes on a positive value, suggesting that the likelihood of whites, who live in low black density areas, voting
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Table 1. Logistic Regression Results for a Model Predicting the
Intended Vote for Mike Foster in the 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial
Election (White Respondents Only)

Fable 2. Results of Logistic Regression Analysis
Based on the Percentage of Black Population
Model 1
% Black < 40

Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Racial Resentment

Variables

Black Density

Racial Rcsentrllent

Unemployment

Individualism

Urban

Ideology

Racial Resentment X Black Density

Party Identification

Unemployment X Black Density

Egalitarianism

Urban X Black Density

Urban

Ideology

Unemployment

Party Identification
Individualism
Egalitarianism
Age
Income
Education

245

MLE
(robust standard crrors)

Model 2
% Black > 40
MLE
(robust standard errors)

Age
Education
Income
Constant

N
-2 Log Likelihood

Gender
Constant

-2 Log Likelihood
N
Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for the intended vote for Foster and 0 otherwise.
*pS.lO **pS.05 ***p<.Ol

for a racially conservative candidate increases as unemployment increases.
According to Model 2, however, the exact opposite occurs. The coefficient
is negative and statistically significant at the .05 level. Again, sqch a finding
runs counter to our expectations. In particular, these findings suggest that,
whites who live in high black density and high unemployment areas are unlikely to vote for Foster.
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Voting for Foster
When Unemployment is Low
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Racial Resentment
The results presented in Table 2 are mixed. In those areas where there
are high concentrations of blacks, the white intended vote choice is conditioned by the hostility that whites direct toward African Americans. On the
other hand, whites who live in high black density and high unemployment
parishes are less likely to vote for Foster. This finding indicates that a realistic group conflict does not exist. Threat should be expected among whites
who are in direct competition with African Americans. Those who live in
high unemployment areas would fit this category. In fact, these findings can
be interpreted as support for the social contact hypothesis. This does not,
however, negate the fact that a threat is present. It is argued here that a
"perceived threat" is at work; one that is driven by whites' resentment towards blacks. These findings are consistent with the conclusion drawn by
Kinder and Sanders (1996). According to these authors, "[tlhe perception
of threat has a systematic foundation, but the foundation is provided not by
actual conditions of conflict and competition but by feelings of racial resentment" (1996, 90). Moreover, Wright contends that, ". . . conditions in
one's environment do not influence behavior directly, but rather indirectly
through social processes and attitudes. . . . A related, but conceptually
different, i a e r p r u - e s
sees cone's attitudes and values" (1977, 505).
Figure 1 provides a comparative analysis for both contexts (i.e., low
and high black densities). Racial resentment is allowed to vary across its
entire range, while unemployment is set at its minimum value. According
to Figure 1, whites who live in parishes with high concentrations of African
Americans and low unemployment levels, and who are racially sympathetic

to African Americans are almost certain not to vote for Foster. As racial
resentment increases, however, the probability of voting for Foster increases. In short, a white who possesses the highest level of resentment
toward African Americans is almost certain to vote for Foster. The probability of voting for Foster is higher for whites who live in low black density
areas, when compared to whites who live in high black density areas, when
racial rcscntmcnt is low. As racial rcscnt~ncntscores incrcasc bcyond thc .5
level, howcvcr, whitcs who livc in arcas with high black dcnsitics arc morc
likely to vote for Foster than are whites who live in low density areas. In
fact, whites who live in high black density areas are almost certain (probability is equal to .99) to vote for Foster when their racial resentment score
is perfect (i.e., one).
Substantively, these findings can be interpreted to mean that whites
who might rely on the government in their time of distress (e.g., unemployed), will vote rationally. In other words, given their self-interests, these
voters will vote for a liberal candidate who is perceived to be more sympathetic during their time of distress. An alternative interpretation could be
that whites who live in close proximity to African Americans and who live
under the same conditions as African Americans will vote like African
Americans.
On the other hand, the results suggest that some whites may not have
the "exit option" (e.g., Tiebout 1956; Hirschman 1970) to relocate or
escape areas containing high concentrations of blacks. Said differently, some
whites may not live in high black density areas because they desire to do so,
they may live there because they do not have the option to "exit" (e.g., can
not afford to move . . .). As a result, we would expect those voters whose
desires are to "exit," given their resentment toward African Americans, to
vote for the racially conservative candidate. In addition, Hirschman (1970).
in Exit, Voice and Loyalfy, argues that one may feel a sense of loyalty to
hisfher community and opt not to exit. It is possible that these people might
not be directly threatened by African Americans, but they may resent them
and therehe "voice" tbeir resentment with their vote (see, e.g., Hirschman
1970). Such reasoning captures the heart of what Kinder and Sanders (1996)
~ , ~ 9 e y ~ W ~ ~ r a c i a l t s r e a t \ a / o s
a tandem team to explain the intended vote for a racially conservative candidate. Indeed, these authors conclude that "the perception of racial threat . . .
is less c o ~ e c t e dto real circumstance, and it is much more a reflection of
racial resentments" (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 68). Whether this threat is
considered to be perceived or not, it clearly provides us with a new way of
examining racial threat.
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Conclusion
The title of this article poses the question, is there a new racial threat
in the "newn South? The answer, based upon the findings here, is a conditional yes. It si conditional, that is, on the percentage of African Americans
that live within a given parish and the level of racial hostility that they direct
towards African Americans. While some may argue that there is nothing
new about the racism in the South, it is clearly the case that racial demagogues are no longer taken seriously as viable candidates for political office.
Indeed, it is the case that ethnocentric candidates, such as David Duke, no
longer use overt racism while campaigning on the stump. The racist demagogue has been replaced by candidates who use racial coded language. The
case ex'nployed here presented an opportunity to examine attitudes toward a
racially conservative white candidate who employed subtle racist tactics to
gain the support of racially conservative voters.
The 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial race is an important contest to examine, given that it included both a white and a black candidate. The inclusion
of this contest is consistent with the original work conducted by Sears and
Kinder, in 1971. Indeed, much of the research investigating symbolic racism
and racial threat has employed contests that have featured only white candidates. The findings here corroborate previous analyses that find racial
resentment to outperform alternative explanations for white support for a
racially conservative candidate and white opposition to racial policy.
The threat reported in this paper differs from the threat of M. The
threat described by Key was one of actual conflict. The threat described
here, on the other hand, is described to be a perceived threat. Indeed, it is
the case that whites who live in high black density areas and high unemployment contcxts are lcss likely to vote for thc racially conscrvativc candidate.
Such findings point to the potential for blacks to build coalitions with neighboring whites, who live under similar unfavorable circumstances, to defeat
racially conservative candidates. Moreover, the findings reported here are
argued to represent a true contextual effect. Unlike previous analyses that
b e relied s o l e l y remhs yielded by &e black density variable being
operationalized as a continuous variable, the disaggregation method allows
us to examine each threshold separately. This analysis examines only one
state, Louisiana. Therefore, it might lack external validity. Despite this limitation, these findings provide strong support for racial resentment as a tandem explanation, along with black density, for the intended white vote for
a racially conservative candidate. It is recommended that future research be
conducted to include a larger sample size including other states.
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Appendix A
Coding of the Control Variables
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f
I

The control variables and their coding are as follows

f

Racial reser~tr~~cnt:
Coded as a 17 category variable where 0 represents racially syhpa.
thetic whites and 1 represents racially resentful whites.

I

Individualism: Coded as a three category variable where 0 = the government should see
to it that every person has a job . . .; .5 = In between; and 1 = the government should
just let each person get ahead on their own.

/\

Egalitariat~isrn:A three category variable where 0 = Minorities should help themselves
.5 = I n bctween; and 1 = Government should help minorities.

f

1

1!

I1
1

J

Ideology: A three category variable where 0 = liberal; .5 = moderate; and 1 = corn
servative.
Parry Identification: A three category variable where 0 = Democrat; .5 = Independent;
and 1 = Republican.
Education: A five category variable where 0 = Through 8th grade; .25 = Grades 9-1 1;
.SO = High School graduate; .75 = Some College; and 1 = College Degree.
Age: A five category variable where 0 = 18-19; .14= 20-29; .29 = 30-39; .43 = 4049; .57 = 50-59; .71 = 60-69; .86 = 70-79; 1 = age 80 and over.
Gender: 0 =Female, 1=Male

i

Income: A six category variable where 0 = < $10,000; .17 = $10,000-25,000; .33 =
$26,000-40.000; .SO = $41.000-60,000; .66 = $61,000-80,000; 1 = Over 80.000.

1i

Conrext~~al
Variables:
% Black Density110
% Unemployed110
% Urban110

7

1

!

I

/

I
(

I

-

v m-

1

-

-

% Racial resentment X % Black Density
% Bhck Density X 96 Unemployment
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Appendix C
Descriptive Statistics

Appendix B
The Wording of Questions Tapping Racial Resentment
--

Now I am going to read several statements. After each one, I would like you to tell me
whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.
Receive Less: Over the last few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
(Disagree)
Agree Strongly
5.5
Agree Somewhat
13.4
Neither Agree Nor Disagree
9.5
Disagree Somewhat
26.5
Disagree Strongly
39.7
Minorities Overcame Prejudice: Irish, Italians, Jewish and other minorities overcame
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special
favors. (Agree)
Agree Strongly
39.3
Agree Somewhat
27.5
Neither Agree Nor Disagree
7.7
Disagree Somewhat
13.6
Disagree Strongly
3.2
In past studies, we have asked people why they think white people seem to get more of
the good things in life in America such as better jobs and more money-than black people
do. These are some of the reasons given by both blacks and whites. Please tell me
whether you agree or disagree with each reason.

Try Harder: It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If blacks
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Agree)
Agree Strongly
39.3
Agree Somewhat
27.5
Neither Agree Nor Disagree
7.7
Disagree Somewhat
13.6
Disagree Strongly
8.3
SIavety Created Conditions: Generations of slavery and discrimination have created
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
@isagree)
-

-

Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree Nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly

--

-

3.6
21.3
38.7

----

-

-

--

--

--

Variable

-

% Urban110
% Unemployment/lO
% Black/lO
Gender (Male)
Education
Income
Ideology
Party Identification
Racial resentment
Age
Individualism
Egalitarianism

N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

S.D.

494
494
494
494
494
494
494
494
494
486
486
483

NOTES
'This is consistent with the extant literature because much of the contemporary
work on racial threat has employed Louisiana as a case study (see, e.g., Voss 1996;
Giles and Buckner 1996. 1995; and Giles and Hertz 1994).
2Giles and Hertz (1994) contend, that this competition is "conceptualized as contextually conditioned" (317). In other words, "[iln contexts where the threat posed by
a minority group is high, the dominant group's response is predicted to be more hostile
than in contexts where that threat is low" (Giles and Hertz 1994, 317).
'As it relates to the research here, as the minority population increases, we would
expect the white electorate to begin forming coalitions with the minority electorate.
4According to Sears (1988, 56), symbolic racism is operationalized based on three
catcgories: antagonism, rescntmcnt and denial of continuing discrimination. The questions
adopted in this paper do not possess an antagonism category, according to the requirements set forth by Sears (1988. 57). In addition, it is argued here that the questions
adopted by Kinder and Sanders (1996. 106-107) support their decision to use racial
resentment as a descrlptlon o t whlte racial attitudes. So, whiIe I adopt the questions used
by Howell (1994), unlike her, I use racial resentment to describe these racial attitudes
because they seem to really be tapping white racial resentment toward African Americans.
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qntuitively, one could posit a two-stage model where black density is posited to impact racial resentment and both racial resentment and black density are posited to impact
the prospective vote choice. Indeed, Glaser (1994) employs symbolic racism (same as
racial resentment here) as an endogenous variable. However, his findings yield no support for a causal relationship between black density afid those instruments traditionally
used to measure symbolic racism. In a separate analysis, not reported here, I employed
a two-stage model where black density was modeled as an antecedent to racial resentment. This relationship did not hold. Finally, an analysis also was conducted to determine if party identification was a function of black density (see e.g., Giles and Hertz
1994), in addition to being an explanation for vote for Foster. There is no support for
such a relationship.
I0One of the criticisms of the racial resentment variable is that it is not valid (i.e.,
it does not encompass an antiblack affect). While feeling thermometers have been used
in the extant literature (see e.g., Sears 1988) to make this case, data limitations have
prevented me from using such a measure here. As a result. I have employed a candidate
evaluation variable for Cleo Fields as a proxy. In an effort to purge this variable of its
nonracial components, an analysis was conducted whereby the Fields' Image variable was
regressed on a number of nonracial independent variables that have been used to examine
candidate evaluation. The residuals from this analysis were saved and a new variable was
created, now argued to be purged of the perceived nonracial effects. This new variable
was then employed as an explanation for racial resentment. The results indicate that the
variable is statistically significant and in the posited direction. These findings support the
notion that racial resentment does encompass an antiblack effect and is therefore a valid
construct.
"Cronbach's alpha is employed to examine the reliability of this construct and
achieves a value of .68. Sears ct al. (1997, 26) report alpha reliabilities that range from
.65 to .78, using a variety of data sources.
"See Appendix C for each of the individual questions and the response rates for
each of the possible answers.
"The contextual variables have been divided by 10, therefore, the regression coefficients represent the change in the dependent per 10 percentage points change in the independent variable. These transformations were made'in order to avoid very small coefficients and standard errors.
'(There has been some debate as to whether robust standard errors should be used
in logistic regression. Sribney (1998) indicates that robust standard errors should be
employed in logistic regression primarily when the model has been poorly specified (i.e.,
the rnodet faits goodness-of-fit testsj. As a precautionary measure, robust standard errors
a r e estimated.
"In a separate analysis not reported here, candidate evaluation models were examined using ordinary least squares. The racial resentment variable was the only independent variable to achieve statistical significancc in all thrce of these models. Further, after
examining the standardized beta coefficients, racial resentment clearly dominated all of
the other variables that achieved statistical significance.
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